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The Emerging Nexus of
Aging and Diversity:
Implications for Public Policy
And Entitlement Reform
This article examines the impending
nexus of population aging and diversity
in the United States. With the dramatic
increase of older persons and minority
and ethnic groups-particularly
Hispanics-theintersection of these
trends will have important
consequences for all aspects of U.S.
society, including public policy,
legislation, retirement planning, and
economics.

By Fernando M. Torres-GII
and Karra Bikson Moga

Setting the Stage
By 2050-fewer than fifty years from now-the
United States will see the merging of two inexorable
trends: aging and diversity. The Census Bureau
projects that by that time the U.S. population will
have grown by fifty percent. Forty percent of that
growth will be equally composed of older persons
and Hispanics.'
Hispanics, of course, are not the only group
that will add to the nation's diversity. Between the
doubling of the retiree population and dramatic increases among Asians and Pacific Islanders,
Hispanics, and other immigrant groups-as well as
African-Americans and Native Americans-a substantial portion of the U.S. population will be
composed of older persons and members of diverse
populations.
What does this mean for U.S. society? What are
the implications for the helping professions? How
should public policy prepare for and respond to its
inevitable demographic destiny? Many implications
arise from this nexus, but one overriding concern
is for those involved in elder law and retirement
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planning to adopt a longer-term perspective in assessing and preparing for these trends. By doing so,
there emerges a need to use the next few years as a
window of opportunity to influence public policy,
alter professional practice and the delivery of legal
services, and redefine how we view the issues of aging, race, ethnicity, and diversity.
Why is that necessary? Those who serve older
persons and those who advocate on the many issues
that affect their quality of life, including elder law
and retirement planning, will find that the demographic changes facing this nation will have profound
impacts on how they serve these populations and
provide for their specialized programs. The composition of older persons today and how they ought to
be served is far different than it was even thirty years
ago. How we serve these populations thirty years
from now will also change in fundamental ways.
Diversity is one of the major elements in these
changes. Because it is occurring in tandem with population and individual aging, there arises the need for
a conceptual framework within which to develop
strategies and responses appropriate to a society
becoming older and more diverse. What are the implications of this nexus, and how might the situation
facing California and the example of entitlement reform shed light on how the field of elder law should
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prepare and respond? Understanding the phenomenon of demographic change is fundamental to these
questions.

The Demographic Imperative
The 2000 Census Bureau data reinforce public recognition that, as a society and as individuals, the
number of older persons, and their longevity are on
the rise. The median age increased from 32.9 years
in 1990 to 35.3 years in 2000 and is expected to
increase to 39 years or older by 2030.2 Since 1900,
life expectancy has increased by 31 years for women
(from 48 to 79) and by 28 years for men (from 46 to
74). In the last century, while the total U.S. population tripled, the elderly population-those who are
65 and older-increased elevenfold. The elderly
population is expected to continue to grow substantially from 2010 to 203 0.4 While Census 2000 found
that 12.4% of the population was over 65, it is expected to increase to 15.7% by 2020 and to 21%
by 2040.5
Population and individual aging are reshaping
the American demographic landscape. While Census 2000 data indicate a leveling off in the growth
rate of older persons (due to the lower fertility rates
of the 1930s and 1940s), that will change shortly
when the Baby Boomers begin to reach sixty-five
years of age and the projected doubling
of the retiree population becomes a reality. Yet, as the society ages, the United
States is witnessing a unique phenomenon: the diversification of its
population.
Census 2000 data make this point
more vivid than ever before. Nearly one
in every three Americans is a member
of a minority group, reflecting the immigration surge of the 1990s.' Not
since the early 1900s have we seen such
a dramatic growth of immigrants and
minority groups. From 1990 to 2000,
the nation's non-Latino white population dropped from 75.6% to 69.1%.7
Latinos are now roughly equal to African-Americans as the nation's two
largest minorities groups. Latinos accounted for 9% of the U.S. population
(22.4 million) in 1990 and 12.5% (35.3
million) in 2000. African-Americans
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showed a more modest increase-from
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12.1% (30 million) to 12.3% (34.6 million). In the
same period, the population of Asians and Pacific
Islanders increased from 2.9% to 3.7%. About
10% (more than 25 million) of Americans today
are foreign-born-less than the highest share in
the last century (15%, or less than 15 million, in
1910) but double the lowest share (5%, or less than
10 million, in 1970).8 In sum, there is greater diversity in the United States today than at any time in its
history.
The two trends of aging and diversity have heretofore been viewed separately and parallel to each
other, as if they coexisted but did not connect. As
Figure One (page 2) illustrates, those trends are about
to converge, and as they do so, they will raise important questions: How will social policy respond? How
should we conceptualize an approach to policy, law,
and research that incorporates these two trends?
What are the implications for elder law?
As the country becomes older and more diverse,
there will be far greater heterogeneity among and
within groups based on race, language, age, socioeconomic circumstances, religion, education,
assimilation, and acculturation levels, and historical
circumstances. Thus, elder law must become more
adept at analysis that accounts for these greater differences. This requires a longer-term perspective that
looks ahead to the year 2050, when the nexus of
America's diversity and aging will be at its fullest.
But it also requires an understanding of the historical evolution that has occurred in the politics of aging
since 1900.

The New Aging
Over the last one hundred years, we have seen the
development of a unique political event-the rise of
older persons as a political force. This politics of
aging refers to older persons and their organized interest groups shaping public policy and influencing
the political agenda. The history of the politics of
aging can be viewed in three time periods: the Young
Aging (pre-1930), the Modern Aging (1930-1990)
and the New Aging (1990-2050).9 The Young Aging
refers to the world's historic proclivity of reverence
toward old age and of filial responsibility.
Admittedly, there are many exceptions to this
rule. But in general, most societies, including the
United States, assumed that families and communities were responsible for the care of older persons.
Old age was generally respected and commanded
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authority. Much of this was due to relatively low life
expectancy throughout human history. That changed
dramatically, at least in the United States, by 1930,
when the Great Depression put older persons in a
precarious situation, with many losing their homes
and retirement security. Blatant poverty among the
elderly (and among much of the general population)
led to organizing by older persons for some measure
of pension and financial support from the government. (Witness the Ham and Eggs movement of the
1930s.) This agitation prompted President Franklin
D. Roosevelt to support the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935.
Subsequently, increased recognition of the vulnerabilities faced by older persons and their families,
and the proliferation of senior citizen groups (e.g.,
American Association of Retired Persons, National
Committee to Protect Social Security and Medicare,
Gray Panthers) led to the passage of old-age entitlement programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, the
Older Americans Act, Supplemental Security Income,
and a host of publicly financed benefits and volunteer programs for older adults. The sanctity of this
social compact-that the U.S. government would
take care of its elders if they paid their taxes and
were good citizens (and not change the rules)-began to erode by 1990. This New Aging period raised
serious questions about the legitimacy and obligation of the government to provide an extensive safety
net based on age, particularly since poverty rates for
persons aged sixty-five and older dropped from as
high as 75% during the Great Depression to 13%
by the 1990s. Correspondingly, poverty rates for
children increased to 20%.10
By 2000, concerns about longevity, federal surpluses and deficits, generational conflicts, and
competing national priorities had lessened the clout
of organized senior citizen advocacy groups and led
to serious efforts at revamping entitlement programs
for the elderly. Today, the U.S. median age is the highest ever, and life expectancy is at seventy-four for
men and seventy-nine for women." Federal deficits,
federal surpluses and, once again, federal deficits have
led to debates about tax cuts versus expenditures for
children, families and education, rather than expanding benefits for the elderly. Groups supporting less
government, more support for children, and fewer
taxes have argued that too much was being done for
older persons. The high costs of entitlement programs
and fears about the pending aging of Baby Boomers
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(and subsequent doubling of the older population)
led to proposals for structural changes in Social Security and Medicare. These arguments and the public
perception that all older persons were doing just fine,
compared with the equally inaccurate perception
during the Modern Aging that all elderly were poor,
led to decreased political influence by senior citizen
advocates. Where might these political developments
lead in the future? How might they influence the
nature of social policy and diversity as we move toward 2050?
Figure Two (page 5) describes a cohort analysis
of the politics of aging and provides a 150-year historical context that suggests key milestones, as well
as developments likely to occur. Beginning with the
year 1900, we see the birth and aging of the New
Deal generation leading to the life cycles of the
Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation X,
and the Baby Boomlet. Between 2000 and 2010, all
five cohorts will co-exist. This is a unique moment
in American history and helps to explain why multigenerational households and communities will be
common. This will be a time when generational tensions will be evident. But it will also be a window of
opportunity to plan for the subsequent aging of
younger cohorts.
Between 2010 and 2020, we will see an entitlement crisis in which our inability to make structural
changes to programs for the elderly will make the
programs untenable and unaffordable. Our lack of
preparation for aging (e.g., limited savings and retirement coverage, lack of long-term care and medical
coverage) will put a large portion of older persons
at risk for poverty and poor health. This rather dire
forecast need not come true if we use the window of
opportunity to plan and take the political actions
necessary to address this demographic inevitability.
However, at this point, there is little political stomach for the hard decisions necessary to prepare for
the aging of the Baby Boomers. Between 2020 and
2050, we will see the full flowering of current social
trends, (e.g., fewer traditional nuclear households,
more women living alone, fewer children), the full
diversity of the United States, economic restructuring, and technological applications. By 2050, the
Baby Boomer cohort will have largely passed on,
today's younger cohorts will be old, and the current
diversity in the younger populations will be reflected
in the older population.
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Entitlement Reform: The Intersection of Age,
Race and Diversity
A cohort analysis of the politics of aging suggests
that the demographic inevitabilities will be replete
with legal, political, and policy tensions. The impending nexus of aging and diversity will see an array of
issues, conflicts, and dilemmas facing this nation as
it responds to the full implications of population
aging. Perhaps no issue reflects the political and legislative intersection of age, race, and diversity than
entitlement reform.
The politics of aging in the year 2000 have led
to an interesting and important debate over the future of Social Security, the bedrock of the New Deal
era. This program has become the basic income security for persons over sixty-five years of age. Social
Security is especially crucial to low-income older
persons, particularly minority elderly. Yet it faces
fundamental changes that reflect generational tensions, concerns over the aging of the Baby Boomer
cohort, and the use of race and diversity as political
tools.
The Social Security Act of 1935 established the
basic federal old-age benefits program and a federalstate system of unemployment insurance.12 Social
Security includes Old Age and Survivor's Insurance,
Disability Insurance, Survivors' Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. The money collected from
payroll taxes, which reached $450 billion in 2001,
goes to pay monthly benefits to more than 45.4 million beneficiaries, including 28.5 million retired
workers, 3.3 million dependents or retirees, 6.7 million disabled workers and their dependents, and 7
million survivors of workers.13 Social Security has
come to symbolize a social contract and an expectation by all Americans that they will have a measure
of protection from the vicissitudes of old age. However, Social Security is facing its greatest test in
proposals to privatize it and alter its basic eligibility
structure.
Privatization, as currently presented, would allow taxpayers to carve an individual security account
out of their payroll taxes. This would allow workers
to use a portion of their Social Security contributions for investments in the private market. Currently,
Social Security is a social insurance program into
which workers pay a portion of their payroll taxes.
In 2001, the tax rate was 7.65% for workers and
for employers on salaries up to $80,400.14 Each
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worker has a general account, and his or her contributions go into a Social Security trust fund, which
in turn is used to cover current beneficiaries and to
pay for administrative costs. Any surplus funds are
invested in federal treasury notes. Privatization would
erode the social insurance nature of this system by allowing workers to control some of those contributions,
and thus divert some of the payroll taxes away from
current beneficiaries. Proponents of this plan argue that
individuals should have the freedom to choose how
their payroll taxes are invested and that the rate of
return in the private market is historically higher than
the low treasury interest rates, which are 3 to 7%.
Opponents argue that Social Security is not an investment seeking rates of return but a civic commitment to
provide a measure of protection to all workers, regardless of how much an individual may pay or receive.
Furthermore, they argue that the transition costs for
creating individual retirement accounts would add up
to a trillion dollars to cover the reduction in funds going to current beneficiaries.
The fuel for these burning debates hinges on the
aging of the Baby Boomer cohort and the reality that,
while Social Security is running big surpluses todayand can cover the forty-five million disabled and
retired persons now living in the United States-those
surpluses will disappear and turn into annual deficits after 2038, when the Baby Boomers will have
retired." Those future deficits, as well as funds
drained out of Social Security through private accounts, could require cutbacks in benefits, increases
in payroll taxes, an increase in the eligibility age or
all of the above. Along with the demographic pressures are concerns that the diminishing program
dependency ratio will mean fewer workers supporting more retirees. That ratio has dropped from 5/1
in 1960 to 3.3/1 today and could reach 2/1 by 2040.16
In the midst of this debate, proponents of
privatization, including groups such as the Heritage
Foundation, insurance companies, and financial
planners, have focused on potentially influential allies: Hispanics, African-Americans, and immigrants.
The interest groups opposing privatization are the
old liberal coalition of labor unions, senior citizen
advocacy groups, progressives, and civil rights organizations. However, proponents have raised an
argument with potentially great appeal to minorities and immigrants: As relatively young groups, they
have the most to gain with the purported higher rates
of return in private accounts.
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In recent years, conservative groups have courted
the Congressional Black Caucus, the Congressional
Hispanic Caucus, and leaders of minority and immigrant groups, and pointed out that, as relatively
young groups accounting for an increasingly larger
share of the work force (and with increasing life expectancy), they should have the right to invest their
funds as they wish.17 With this argument comes the
subtle implication that minorities should not be
forced to shoulder the burden of supporting an older
white retiree population. And for the most ideologically minded minority advocates, white retirees
represent the source of past discrimination and injustices.
This argument has crucial weaknesses. It does
not account for the critical safety nets that Social
Security represents, including Disability Insurance,
Supplemental Security Income, and survivors' benefits, nor for the fact that minority elderly depend
on Social Security (and OASI) to a greater extent
than older whites." In a longer-term perspective,
privatization ignores the fact that younger minorities, especially those most at risk, will need the full
benefits and protections of the Social Security system. Regardless, privatization has potentially
enormous appeal for younger members of minority
groups, who are concerned more with their immediate needs-survival, jobs-and those of their
children. The regressive nature of the payroll tax
means that lower-income persons would pay a greater
share of their income than higher-income individuals because of the cap on income subject to
withholding. Thus, the politics of privatization have
engendered new ingredients: race, minority status,
and diversity.
The outcome of these debates is unclear. President Bush created a commission to study Social
Security reform with a mandate to give workers optional personal savings accounts invested in stocks
and bonds. Democrats and their allies will oppose
this plan, but public opinion polls indicate that a
large majority of the American public, particularly
younger workers, are open to some form of
privatization. Minority and immigrant groups can
expect to be courted by both sides. However this
unfolds, in a society becoming more diverse and with
an increasingly diverse workforce where the retiree
population is still largely white and English-speaking, we can expect that the politics of aging will be
more affected by diversity.
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California
This phenomenon is especially apparent in a
multicultural state like California, which has a growing Hispanic population. The impending convergence
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of two major demographic trends in Californiathe aging of the white population and the growth of
the Latino community-will literally change the face
of the Golden State over the next half century.

Figure 3. Shifting Demographics in California
In 20 years. the two largestgroups will be today's Baby Boomers-made up mostly of retired or soon-toretire whites-and today's Millennials and Post-Millennials,who will make up the bulk of the workforce.
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Whether an increasingly young and Hispanic
workforce will shoulder the costs of financing the
retirement of a largely white electorate is as yet unclear. And as the numbers shift and the social,
financial and political pressures mount, how these
two groups address that issue will play a fundamental role in shaping the State's future.
The growth of ethnic and minority populations
in the United States and in California will eventually
make white, non-Hispanic populations a minority
group in many areas. In fact, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau and the California Department of
Finance, demographic change in California was so
far advanced in the 1990s that the State was expected
to begin the new millennium without a majority ethnic group.
Why are these groups, especially Hispanics, the
targets of political attention in the debates around
Social Security? First, Hispanics' growing numbers
give them considerable political clout. On Capitol
Hill, the Hispanic Congressional Caucus is a potent
force. In California, the growing number of Hispanic
state legislators and the election of the first Hispanic
lieutenant governor in the last century point to Hispanics' very real power in policy-making. Second,
Hispanics are becoming a crucial part of the electorate in the key states of Florida, Texas, and California.
The dramatic increase in naturalization and registration among Hispanics gives them considerable
electoral influence, especially as a swing vote. Third,
and perhaps more important for this century, Hispanics will make up much of the workforce in a
nation with a large proportion of non-Hispanic
elderly.
Hispanics remain a relatively young population
with higher fertility levels than whites and AfricanAmericans. Higher rates of continued immigration
from Mexico and Latin America guarantee that they
will increasingly become a larger part of the California population. As the percentage of whites decreases
from 77% in 1970 to a projected 39% in 2021, the
Hispanic population will grow to 40% and become
the largest ethnic group in the State. As a result, the
politics of aging will be increasingly defined by the
nexus of a largely young, working-age population
of Hispanics supporting a large proportion of white,
English-speaking retirees.
The crossroads of aging and Latinization raise
the potential for conflict-and for possible alliances.
Such writers as David Hayes-Bautista-one of the
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first to identify the nature of an age-race stratified
society-point to a potential scenario of young, resentful Hispanics unwilling to pay the taxes needed
to support older whites who are guilty of real or
imagined wrongdoings toward minorities. This scenario has some validity. The passage of California
ballot measures to eliminate benefits to immigrants,
abolish affirmative action, and restrict bilingual education resonate with Hispanic voters who currently
feel they can't yet match the electoral clout of middleaged and white voters.
On the other hand, the potential for alliancesactions based on the perceived need to find common
ground among young Hispanics and older whitesexists. Each group will need the other in the coming
decades. Hispanics, whites, and other minority and
ethnic groups all face the dilemmas of living longer
and facing the vicissitudes of old age (e.g., poverty,
disability). Seeking public policy solutions that
bring together-rather than divide-groups on the
basis of race, ethnicity, and age will become increasingly important to a society becoming older and more
diverse.
California shows where the future of the United
States is moving as well as the dilemmas surrounding opportunities to create scenarios that minimize
intergroup conflicts, and result in laws and policies
that address the common needs of all persbns growing older. Other states, such as Hawaii, Florida, and
New York, are facing similar dilemmas. But the absolute size and diversity of California make it a
bellwether for the aging and diversification of the
United States.

Implications and Lessons
Given the demographic trends and the debates over

entitlement, and examining the California situation,
what are the implications drawn from the impending nexus of aging and diversity? What lessons can
be gleaned for those working in the field of elder
law and representing the legal and retirement interests of older clients?
Foremost is the need to accept that, in an aging
society, change is constant. How we view older persons today is much different from how we viewed
them thirty years ago and will be still more different
thirty years from now. Analyzing demographic trends
gives clues about those changes which include increasing longevity, smaller households, more
geographically dispersed families, growing numbers
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of women, persons with disabilities, and racial and
ethnic groups.
Cohort analysis is a useful tool for identifying possible changes and trends. While it is easy to
over-generalize generational identities, examining the
intra-cohort differences, as well as the differences
among cohorts, gives important clues about group
values, preferences and politics. The aging of the Baby
Boomers will illuminate the major changes and shifts
occurring over the next fifty years. This group in
particular is redefining what it means to be old, and
will reshape how we provide programs and services
to older persons.
As the Baby Boomers age, diversity and race will
be critical ingredients in society. Minority elders will
account for a greater proportion of this cohort. But
perhaps more important, younger, working-age
populations will be increasingly composed of immigrants, minorities, and women, which will mean that
diversity will greatly influence the ability of younger
cohorts to support older populations. As the case
with California shows, we may face tensions between
younger minority groups and older white retirees
unless we promote public policies and political strategies that move beyond current laws and policies that
focus on age and race as eligibility criteria for public
benefits and programs. We can expect to see a greater
focus on ADLs (activities of daily living) rather than
age as a basis of targeting those most in need.
Intergenerational programs are becoming another
preferred option for bringing different age groups
together.
In responding to aging and diversity, it will be
necessary to understand and apply the concepts of
assimilation, acculturation, and immigration to our

lexicon of analysis and legal strategies. Assimilation
(adopting mainstream values) and acculturation (becoming adept at functioning in a dominant society)
address the extent to which immigrant and ethnic
groups are able to become part of the American
mosaic. How we apply these three realities in policy
and legal analysis will determine the efficacy of proposals and actions in responding to aging and
diversity.
Public policy and subsequent laws, regulations,
and administrative decisions will be influenced by
the politics of aging and the interplay of interestgroup politics, public opinion, and electoral politics.
The advent of ethnic and racial political influence
alongside that of senior citizen political clout will
complicate political actions and decisions and influence debates over entitlement reform and responses
to the pressing needs of older persons and minority
groups. For example, no longer can we view racial
politics as simply a black-white dichotomy. Asian
and Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and other immigrant
groups (e.g., Armenians, Muslims, Eastern Europeans) will be part of the political landscape. And their
influence on the politics of aging will depend on their
perspectives on aging and diversity.
The next fifty years will be a complex but exciting time in the ongoing American experience with
democracy and social cohesion. Older persons and
diverse populations will reshape the American profile and influence its public policy. This is an
opportune time to understand and prepare for the
emerging nexus of these social trends and, by doing
so, respond effectively to the benefits and potential
of a society that is older, more diverse and, we hope,
wiser.
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